One of the most knowledgeable airline people I know recently wrote that the under-75 seat regional jet is dead. Ben Baldanza’s position set off a flurry of commentary, much of it agreeing with the notion that, yes, the smaller regional jet (usually defined as an airplane with under 100 seats) plays an ever-diminishing role in today’s airline industry and is likely on the way out.  We disagree. Respectfully, because we think Ben’s a smart man.

If regional jets go the way of the dodo bird, it’s not because they’re not economically viable. They’re just not economically viable within the strictures of the traditional hub-and-spoke model of today’s major airline operations. They can, however, thrive if they’re deployed appropriately to match emerging point-to-point opportunities.

Current Aviation, for example, has identified 400 or so markets that would do quite well with point-to-point regional jet service, using traditional travel data and modeling. These are cities that have grown substantially in the 30-plus years since the introduction of regional jets – markets that today could profitably be served with one to three daily operations, using under 100-seat aircraft, at currently observed ticketed fares.

They can also do so cost-effectively, with less pain for customers and crews and in a more environmentally friendly way. Consider:

The only real lever the majors have to reduce unit cost is to fly larger planes, for all the reasons cited in Ben’s piece. However, total trip cost does matter and would be the primary consideration in short-haul markets with less than 100-150 passengers “per day each way” (PDEW). As stage length increases, the unit cost on the larger plane wins out if there is sufficient demand.

Missing in the assertion that smaller jets are the “mechanical equivalent of the dodo bird” is the consideration of a non-stop vs. connecting itinerary. Connections are inherently expensive. Collecting passengers from smaller cities and funneling through hubs is an efficient (or maybe “least bad”) way to serve markets that are too small to justify nonstop service. But many passengers in “secondary” cities are poorly served by this model, especially in markets where there is significant business demand between these secondary cities.

• Operating nonstop on an appropriately sized plane significantly reduces the cost to carry a passenger from point A to B by 15 percent to more than 50 percent depending on how far out of the way the connecting hub is.  These use fewer hours of pilot time, cabin crew time, landing fees, and significantly less fuel. This means that if a market has demand for 50 customers each day and could be served nonstop, the cost to service each customer is significantly lower than a connection.

For a practical example, check a www.google.com/flights search between two cities within roughly 500 miles of each other and at least one nonstop flight option and some connecting flight options. You’ll generally find that the connecting flight is roughly 4.5 to six hours, compared with a one-to-two-hour nonstop flight. Back out roughly an hour for the connection, and we are talking three to four times crew time.

Also note the average emissions in the flight display, an estimate of the fuel burned per passenger. Nonstops range from average to 15 percent or more below average. Emissions for connections are easily 10-30 percent higher, and often 60 percent and even more than 100 percent higher than a similarly situated nonstop.

The impact of LCCs is largely irrelevant in most of these viable short haul markets, as LCCs also rely on the gauge/CASM game. The LCCs’ larger aircraft work well in very high demand markets, largely leisure (Las Vegas, Florida), and focus on nonstop travelers. They can function in lower demand markets, but with an inconvenient few flights per week compared to the daily services that are better for most travelers.

There is some urgency to figuring this out, and soon. Every large hub is overwhelmed during connecting times as all legacy and LCC carriers continue to rapidly replace their fleets with new aircraft that are 30-50 seats larger than previous fleets. Weather, ATC constraints, full flights, staffing shortages for customer service and call center positions have proven that operational and customer recovery is virtually impossible without inflicting major pain – and cost – on travelers, crews, and airport personnel.

If Republic, Skywest, Mesa, AirWisconsin and others with under-100-seat aircraft want to thrive and put these fleets to work they can reach out to me at Brad Beakley